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1 Introduction
This paper extends the model described in Krugman and Venables (1995) and, in a
slightly dierent way, in Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1998). It includes capital as
an additional factor of production and it identies capital owners as a distinct group
of agents. In addition to transportation costs, the paper introduces imperfect capital
mobility as a further wedge between countries.
Krugman and Venables (1995) present a 2-country model that predicts a U-shaped
pattern of real incomes during successive phases of economic integration of core and
periphery regions. This pattern is meant to rationalise changing positions in the dis-
cussion of the eects of (global) economic integration. In the 1960s and 1970s many
people argued that integration would harm the developing countries, whereas in re-
cent years many people have come to believe that the dicult economic situation in
the OECD countries has been aected by market integration that has favoured newly
industrialised countries, as for example the countries of South East Asia.
The modelling device that generates this outcome is a model with intermediate goods
and transportation costs, which is based on Krugman (1980) and Ethier (1982).
1
The
usage of intermediate goods in the manufacturing sector creates linkages. First, so
called forward linkages: a greater variety of intermediate products available reduces the
production costs. The costs are lowered the more, the more goods are produced in the
same country, because they are not subject to transportation costs. Second, there are
backward linkages in which an increase in the share of manufacturing in one country, i.e.
more rms, increases the demand for all the varieties produced in this country through
higher demand for intermediate usage by all the other rms in the same country.
To this, we add imperfectly mobile capital owned by another group of agents named
capitalists. This simplied set-up perfectly splits investment from consumption deci-
sions. The capitalists are only interested in maximising their return on investment and
do not take into account the eects of their decisions on the workers' income.
2
The
restrictions to capital mobility in the model shall grosso modo reect all the restric-
tions that are prevalent in the real world, like quantitative restrictions to capital import
and export,
3
costs of monitoring foreign investment,
4
and maybe risk considerations
1
A variant of this model has been used to analyse issues of industrial clustering, see Krugman and
Venables (1996).
2
It may be regarded as a nice interpretation to consider the capitalists as a nancial sector that
is investing the savings of the consumers and does not take into account the repercussions of their
decisions, which mostly arise from the eects of investment on labour income, on the owners of the
capital. This interpretation comes rather close to the popular fear that a globalised nancial sector is
controlling the real sides of the economies without any control. If it appears more convenient, one can
think of two classes of individuals, proletarians and capitalists.
3
Up to some years ago many countries did have tight quantity constraints on the import and export
of capital. And if one is thinking over longer horizons of course all the former communist countries have
more or less been isolated from the western nancial markets.
4
Like having a lawyer or an investment bank that is taking charge of the foreign investment.
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associated with foreign investment.
5
Parallelling the approach of Krugman and Venables, we will think of a sequence of equi-
libria parameterised by declining market restrictions, to assess the eects of continuing
integration. The sequences may be best thought of as sequences of steady states, which
again shows that the model is intended to analyse long-term developments.
It turns out that the model has a continuum of equilibria. All the equilibrium sets are
characterised and analytical expressions for all equilibria are given for all the variables
except the price indices (and therefore the real wages). The numerical computation of
the price indices is also described.
Following the popular idea that the (uncontrollable) nancial sector is controlling the
worldwide evolution of economies, the sequence of equilibria that is analysed is the
capitalists' income maximising sequence. This means that given the state of integration
the capitalists (of country 1) have the power to choose the equilibrium that gives them
the largest income.
6
This leads to the following pattern of industrial agglomeration: In a situation with large
restrictions one country is specialised in manufacturing whereas the other country is
active on both sectors. During the rst stage of integration, the manufacturing sector is
shrinking in the industrialised country and growing in the other one. This corresponds to
the situation that is seen as a threat to high living standards in industrialised countries
today. This phase is characterised by a rising income of workers and capitalists in the
country that experiences industrialisation. Later, after the restriction to capital mobility
has dropped below a critical value, all the worldwide manufacturing is concentrated in
one country. This has severe adverse eects on real income of the workers in the de-
industrialised country, while it has positive eects on the real income of the workers
in the country that has captured the whole manufacturing sector. During the course
of integration, the income of the capital owners of the two countries is equalised. In
this model integration thus favours the owners of the mobile factor capital in contrast
to the immobile factor labour. Thus workers living in the country which has managed
to attract the manufacturing sector therefore happen to prot from the process of
economic integration.
Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3 the equilibrium structure is described, in
5
Our model has no risk. One can, however, still regard risk as a factor that reduces the eective, or
average, rate of return on investment.
6
Due to the fact that there is a continuum of equilibria an equilibrium has to be chosen at each
point of the integration process. In our model the most intrinsically consistent choice is to choose the
equilibrium that maximises the return on investment. The results do not change qualitatively if the
worldwide income of capitalists is taken as the criterion for selecting equilibria. Besides the above,
"natural" candidates would be equilibria with a specied allocation of revenue between capitalists and
workers, or equilibria maximising a social welfare function at each point of the sequence. It may also
be an interesting task to compare these equilibrium sequences.
This equilibrium selection can be interpreted as the result of a limiting bargaining situation in which
the capitalists have all the bargaining power.
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Section 4 the sequence of equilibria during ongoing integration is discussed and Section
5 presents some nal remarks. There are two appendices. In Appendix A a special case
of an equilibrium that can be treated analytically is shortly discussed and Appendix B
reports all the comparative statics results.
2 Description of the Model
In my presentation I closely follow the lines of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1998).
The world is assumed to consist of two economies which will be labelled 1 and 2 through-
out the paper. Subscripts are used to refer to the countries. The two countries are iden-
tical with respect to their endowments of labour, capital and the available technology.
In each country there are two types of agents: consumers (workers) and capitalists. The
countries are also identical with respect to the preferences of consumers and capitalists.
The following description omits country indices if the described relationship holds for
both countries. Where necessary, countries will be distinguished.
The workers in the economies all share the same preferences
V =M

A
1 
(1)
where A is the consumption of the agricultural good and M is a quantity index of
manufactured goods consumption. Both countries are endowed with a total of L = 1
units of labour. Labour is perfectly mobile between the two sectors and completely
immobile across the two countries. The agricultural good is taken to be the numeraire,
i.e. its price is set to one.  is the constant expenditure share of manufactures. M is
dened over a continuum of varieties of manufactured goods
M = (
Z
N
0
m(i)

di)
1=
; 0 <  < 1 (2)
where m(i) denotes the consumption of the variety i and N is the range of varieties
produced.  is a parameter reecting the preference for variety. The smaller  the larger
the preference for variety. This formulation has been popularised by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977).
The representative consumer's problem, given income Y and all the prices p(i), can be
solved in two steps, because the consumer preferences are separable between agriculture
and manufacturing. First one has to minimise the expenditures necessary to obtainM ,
for any given value of M . This results in demands m(j) =
p(j)
1=( 1)
[
R
N
0
p(i)
=( 1)
di]
1=
M for all
the dierent varieties m(j). Multiplying m(j) with its price p(j) and integrating over
all the varieties yields
Z
N
0
p(j)m(j)dj = [
Z
N
0
p(i)

 1
di]
 1

M (3)
The term multiplyingM on the right hand side of equation (3) can be interpreted as a
price index. This interpretation implies that the expenditure on manufacturing is equal
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to the price index of the composite good times the quantity index of consumption of
manufactured goods.
Dening  =
1
1 
, gives P = [
R
N
0
p(i)

 1
di]
 1

= [
R
N
0
p(i)
1 
di]
1
1 
. >From the Cobb-
Douglas preferences, we immediately know the allocation of income between M and A:
M = Y=P and A = (1   )Y . Substituting this expression shows that the consumer
demand for each of the varieties of manufactures is given by m(j) = Y
p(j)
 
P
1 
; 8j 2
[0; N ]. The consumers' sole source of income is labour, so Y = w, where w is the
nominal, i.e. measured in units of the agricultural good, wage. Real wage !, i.e. nominal
wage divided by the consumer price index, is given by
! = wP
 
(4)
The agricultural good is tradable without transportation costs. This implies that there
is one worldwide market for the agricultural good. The manufactured goods are subject
to transportation costs. For simplicity these costs are modelled as iceberg transport costs:
only a fraction
1
T
, T  1, of a unit shipped, arrives in the other country. With a simple
specication like this, we avoid the necessity to model an additional transportation
industry. So, if a specic variety k is produced in country 1, its prices in 1 and 2 are
given by p
2
(k) = p
1
(k)T .
In equilibrium all varieties produced in one country must sell at the same price, because
they enter utility symmetrically and are produced with the same technology. Thus, the
manufacturing price indices can be expressed as
P
1
= (n
1
p
 ( 1)
1
+ n
2
(p
2
T )
 ( 1)
)
 
1
 1
(5)
P
2
= (n
1
(p
1
T )
 ( 1)
+ n
2
p
 ( 1)
2
)
 
1
 1
(6)
where n
i
denotes the "number" of varieties produced in country i and P
i
stands for the
price indices in the two countries.
The capitalists in the two economies are endowed with W
1
= W
2
=

2(1  )
7
units of
capital. In this paper we will use K
i
for the amount of capital employed in country i.
8
The capitalists' sole objective is maximising the return on capital.
9
Capital is imper-
fectly mobile. In this paper we model the restrictions on capital mobility in a fashion
similar to the transportation costs prevalent on the manufactured goods markets. In
each country there is only one capital market, i.e. there are no separate markets for
capital owned by either domestic or foreign investors. This implies that there is only
one interest rate per country. Now for each unit of capital invested abroad an investor
7
The parameters  and  will appear later in the production function for manufactures. This choice
of endowment with capital turns out to be very convenient when solving for equilibrium.
8
This need not be equal toW
i
, the amount of capital owned by the capitalists resident in the country
i. LetW
ij
denote the amount of capital owned by capitalists resident in i that is invested in the country
j. Then of course K
1
+K
2
= (W
11
+W
21
) + (W
12
+W
22
) =W
1
+W
2
has to hold (in equilibrium).
9
With this simple specication the capitalists are only interested in obtaining as much of the nu-
meraire, i.e. of the agricultural good, as possible. Therefore there are no demand eects on the manu-
factured goods market from this side.
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does not earn r units of the agricultural good, but only r=U , with U being  1, units.
Solving the problem of the representative capitalist (resident in country 1) trivially
leads to the following capital supply function:
W
S
11
=
8
>
>
<
>
:
W
1
if r
1
> r
2
=U
2 [0;W
1
] if r
1
= r
2
=U
0 if r
1
< r
2
=U
The incomes of capitalists resident in country 1 and 2 are given by
C
1
= r
1
W
11
+
r
2
U
W
12
(7)
C
2
=
r
1
U
W
21
+ r
2
W
22
(8)
Next we turn to the description of the behaviour of the producers in the economy. Agri-
culture uses only labour as an input and is assumed to be a perfectly competitive CRS
sector. For simplicity, the agricultural good is produced with a linear technology, where
normalisation is such that one unit of labour is producing one unit of the agricultural
good. The economy-wide production of agriculture is then given by A = (1 ), where
 denotes the share of labour of the economy devoted to manufacturing.
Manufacturing is a monopolistically competitive IRS sector that uses labour, capital
and intermediate goods as inputs to produce the varieties of manufactures. Technology
is Cobb-Douglas and assumed to be identical for all the varieties and both countries.
The scale eects thus occur at the level of production of the dierent varieties. For this
reason, and because we assume free entry and exit and an unlimited potential of vari-
eties, two competitive rms won't choose to produce the same variety. The production
function of an operating rm is given by
F + cq = Dl
1  
k

[
Z
N
0
g(i)

di]
=
(9)
where q is the quantity produced, l the amount of labour used, k the amount of capital
used; the integral term represents the quantity index of the manufactured goods used
as intermediates. g(i) denotes the quantity used of variety i. With this specication
of intermediate demand of the rm sector, we nd that the intermediate composite
good used as an input in production has the same composition as the aggregate of
manufactured varieties demanded by the consumers (in the same country). This set-up
is convenient when deriving total demand for manufactures. F stands for the xed costs
that an operating rm incurs, c is the marginal input requirement.
10
Firms are prot maximising, price takers on their input markets and price setters on
their output market. Furthermore, when taking their decision, rms consider the price
index P xed. The prot function of a rm is given by
(i) = p(i)q(i)   w
1  
r

P

(F + cq(i)) (10)
10
The constant D is set to (
1
1  
)
1  
(
1

)

(
1

)

.
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where p(i) denotes the price of the produced variety, q(i) the quantity produced and w
and r are the wage and interest rates.
Taking into account the pricing behaviour of the monopolistic rm and noting that 
is the elasticity of demand perceived (keeping P xed) , p(1  
1

) = w
1  
r

P

c has
to hold. Choosing units so that c = (1 
1

) we obtain
p = w
1  
r

P

(11)
Inserting the price in the prot function yields  = w
1  
r

P

[
q

  F ]. Free entry
drives prots down to zero in equilibrium, so that the equilibrium quantity produced
by all the rms is q

= F.
The technology described above implies that every rm uses all the varieties of ma-
nufactured products as intermediates. So the producers, as well as the consumers gain
from having a larger worldwide variety of manufactured goods. This is a forward link-
age. In addition, as already mentioned in the introduction, the larger the share of
varieties produced in one country, the larger the reduction in the price index that the
rms (and consumers) experience in this country, because less varieties are subject to
transportation costs.
Now we collect all the equations and identities describing equilibrium. The income of
the workers Y is the sum of workers' earnings in agriculture and in manufacturing
Y = (1  ) + w (12)
Y can exceed one only if all labour is devoted to manufacturing and manufacturing pays
a wage higher than one. Total expenditure E on manufactures in the two countries
is composed of consumer demand - fraction  of consumer income - and the rms'
intermediate demand - fraction  of total costs or, equivalent in equilibrium, of total
revenue - and is given by
E
i
= Y
i
+ n
i
p
i
q

The above equation can be modied by using the following equilibrium conditions on
factor payments that directly follow from the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology.
(1     )n
i
p
i
q
eq
= w
i

i
n
i
p
i
q
eq
= r
i
K
i
n
i
p
i
q
eq
= P
i
M
i
where K
i
is the capital employed in country i andM
i
is the economy wide intermediate
demand in i. Now choose units so that q

=
1
1  
, i.e. set F to
1
(1  )
. Then
P
i
M
i
=

1  
w
i

i
and n
i
=
w
i

i
p
i
. The (gross) interest earned on capital in country i
is then r
i
K
i
=

1  
w
i

i
. Because of imperfect capital mobility, this only equals the
amount that the owners of the capital get paid, if there is no cross border investment or
I H S { Wagner / Capital and Goods Market Integration 7
the restrictions are degenerated, i.e. U = 1. Using the above expressions, the expenditure
equation can be expressed as
E
i
= Y
i
+

1     
w
i

i
(13)
The above normalisations have been made because the focus is on the allocation of
labour between the sectors and on the allocation of capital between the countries, not
on the number of rms or the prices.
11
Inserting the above relations, we can express the price index for country 1 (analogous
for country 2) as
P
1 
1
= (n
1
p
1 
1
+ n
2
(p
2
T )
1 
)
= (w
1

1
p
 
1
+ w
2

2
p
 
2
T
1 
)
= (w
1

1
(w
1  
1
r

1
P

1
)
 
+ w
2

2
(w
1  
2
r

2
P

2
)
 
T
1 
)
(14)
Use r
i
K
i
=

1  
w
i

i
, dene
~
K
i
= K
i
1  

to further modify the price index equa-
tions to
P
1 
1
= (w
1 (1 )
1

1 
1
~
K
1

P
 
1
+ w
1 (1 )
2

1 
2
~
K
2

P
 
2
T
1 
) (15)
P
1 
2
= (w
1 (1 )
1

1 
1
~
K
1

P
 
1
T
1 
+ w
1 (1 )
2

1 
2
~
K
2

P
 
2
) (16)
Noting that
~
K
1
+
~
K
2
=
1  

(K
1
+ K
2
) =
1  

(W
1
+ W
2
) = 1, we see that the
quantities
~
K
i
are the shares of worldwide capital allocated to country i. The demand
for a single variety v produced in country one is given by
q(v)
D
= E
1
p
 
1
P
 1
1
+E
2
(p
1
T )
 
P
 1
2
T (17)
The rst term is the demand for consumption and intermediate usage from country 1,
the second term is the demand from the other country. Now we use the fact that rms
sell q =
1
1  
units in equilibrium and the price equation (11) to obtain
(w
1  
1
r

1
P

1
)

= (1     )(E
1
P
 1
1
+E
2
P
 1
2
T
1 
) (18)
(w
1  
2
r

2
P

2
)

= (1     )(E
1
P
 1
1
T
1 
+E
2
P
 1
2
) (19)
We will refer to the above equations as the wage-interest equations, since they give com-
binations of wages and interest rates consistent with zero prots.
12
For our purposes,
it is convenient to rewrite these equations as follows
(w
1  
1


1
~
K
1
 
P

1
)

= (1     )(E
1
P
 1
1
+E
2
P
 1
2
T
1 
) (20)
(w
1  
2


2
~
K
2
 
P

2
)

= (1     )(E
1
P
 1
1
T
1 
+E
2
P
 1
2
) (21)
11
In this respect we follow the lines of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1998). We do not refer to the
approach in Krugman and Venables (1995).
12
Fujita, Krugman and Venables derive similar equations without an interest rate term and label
them wage equations.
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For completeness' sake, it remains to characterise equilibrium on the agricultural (nu-
meraire) market. The worldwide supply of agricultural goods is given by (1 
1
)+(1 

2
). Demand is the sum of two components: Consumption demand, which is given by
(1 )(Y
1
+ Y
2
), and the (gross) interest payments r
1
K
1
+ r
2
K
2
. Equating supply and
demand gives
(1  
1
) + (1  
2
) = (1  )(Y
1
+ Y
2
) + (r
1
K
1
+ r
2
K
2
) (22)
Finally, in equilibrium capital demand has to equal capital supply in both countries.
13
3 Equilibrium Structure: Wages, Interest Rates and In-
come
When discussing asymmetric equilibria we will focus on the case where country 1 is the
more industrialised country.
14
Dierences in equilibria may depend on whether both
countries have both sectors active and on whether there are cross border capital ows.
Of course, in a situation in which all the manufacturing is concentrated in one country,
all the capital must have been invested in this country.
Both workers and capitalists gain from a clustering of manufacturing in one country.
The reduction of the price index that is implied by this agglomeration increases the
real income of workers ! and the protability of rms via reduced expenditures on
intermediates and an increased demand for intermediate usage from other rms located
in the same country. If the agglomeration eects are strong, this potentially allows rms
in the country with the larger manufacturing share to pay higher interest rates than
the rms in the other country, which in turn attracts foreign capital. Of course, it
is advantageous for capitalists to be resident in the country that is relatively more
specialised in manufacturing and has a higher interest rate. Because only in-owing
capital is subject to restrictions on the capital market, the capitalists based in the
industrialised country have higher (net) returns than foreign investors.
For all the values of T and U the symmetric situation, in which the two countries are
identical with respect to the values of all variables, is an equilibrium. The values of all
the variables can be easily determined for this equilibrium. First note that w
1
= w
2
= 1
and that therefore Y
1
= Y
2
= 1 have to hold because agriculture is active in both
countries. Next, use (22) to determine the symmetric  =
(1  )
1 
. Thus we derive
13
Using Walras' law we could skip one market in the description of equilibrium.
14
It is a fairly general feature of the so called New Trade Theory models that there is a substantial
amount of indeterminacy due to the usually completely symmetric set-up of the (2-country) models.
The models therefore have the ability to generate asymmetries but they do not endogenously explain
the reason why one symmetric country attains the favourable position rather than the other. According
to our view this is a nice feature of these models because it leaves room for other aspects like culture
or history that cannot be modelled directly to serve as explanatory factors of asymmetric evolution.
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E
1
= E
2
=

1 
. Now insert the known quantities in (15); (16) or (18); (19) and use
~
K
1
=
~
K
2
= 1=2 to obtain
P
1 (1 )
1
= P
1 (1 )
2
= (
1
2
)


1 
(1 + T
1 
) (23)
The interest rate is given by r = 2 =
2(1  )
1 
. The capitalists' income C is equal to

1 
, real wages are given by ! = P
 
.
We can also prove the existence of a specialised equilibrium. The meaning of special-
ized depends on the level of manufacturing necessary to satisfy worldwide demand with
manufacturing being either solely concentrated in one country or, if there has to be a
larger manufacturing sector, in both countries with one country having only manufac-
turing.
15
As indicated, we will take country 1 to be specialised. To be able to proceed
analytically, we will restrict ourselves (at the moment) to an analysis of the case in
which all manufacturing goods can be produced by country 1.
16
Thus, we can still use
w
1
= w
2
= 1 when solving for equilibrium.
17
To solve for the values of the variables
in a specialised situation, we proceed as follows. From w
1
= w
2
= 1 we immediately
derive Y
1
= Y
2
= 1. We also know by assumption that 
2
= 0 has to hold. Use (22)
to determine 
1
=
2(1  )
1 
. For this being smaller (or equal) than one,  <
1 
2(1  )
has to hold, i.e. we have to impose an upper bound on the share of manufactures  in
consumption to guarantee that worldwide demand for manufacturing can be satised
by one country.
18
Next substitute the expression for 
1
in (13) to obtain E
1
= 
1+
1 
and E
2
= . Now solve for the price indices by inserting in (15) and (16) to get
P
1
= 
1 
1 (1 )
1
and P
2
= P
1
T . The equation P
2
= P
1
T is derived from the fact that
in the situation described all the varieties of manufactures have to be shipped from 1
to 2. Real wages are given by !
1
= P
 
1
and !
2
= !
1
T
 
. The capitalists' income is
given by C
1
= r
1
W
1
=

1 
and C
2
= C
1
=U =

U(1 )
.
19
In this situation workers and
capitalists resident in country 1 are better o because they have higher real wages and
a higher rate of return.
Now it remains to clarify when this situation is an equilibrium. It can only be an
equilibrium when it is not protable to invest in country 2 and start manufacturing
production there. This protability question can be decided by looking at the wage-
15
The case where all manufacturing is concentrated in one country can be divided in two sub-cases,

1
< 1 and 
1
= 1. The second case will be referred to as the perfectly asymmetric case, where there is
only manufacturing in country 1 and only agriculture in country 2.
16
The case with a large manufacturing sector is discussed later on.
17
In the perfectly asymmetric case we still can nd the value of w
1
 1 and can also proceed
analytically.
18
Strictly speaking one has to choose the parameters ,  and  in a way that this inequality is
fullled but the interpretation given in the text is very natural. In the context of the paper of Krugman
and Venables, where  would be 0, this condition would be reduced to  <
1
2
.
19
The results for the perfectly asymmetric case are given in Appendix A.
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interest equation of country 2 in the context of the specialised situation
(w
1  
2
r

2
P

2
)

= (1     )(E
1
P
 1
1
T
1 
+E
2
P
2
)
= (1     )(
1+
1 
P
 1
1
T
1 
+ P
 1
1
T
 1
)
(24)
To attract labour, a manufacturing rm planning to start production in 2 has to pay a
wage of w
2
= 1. Using this, P
1
= 
1 
1 (1 )
1
and r
1
= 
1
(24) further simplies to
r
2
= r
1
(
1 + 
2
T
1 
+
1  
2
T
 1
)
1

T
 


(25)
Here r
2
stands for the maximum interest rate a rm planning to start production in 2
would be able to pay its capital owners while achieving zero prots. This implies that
the specialised situation is an equilibrium if
U
 
> (
1 + 
2
T
1 
+
1  
2
T
 1
)T
 
(26)
(26) describes the feasible region of T and U , given ; ;  and , that allow for a
specialised equilibrium with w
1
= 1. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
Within the specialised region (the workers') real income, the capitalists' income and
the price level in country 2 vary according to the values of T and U . The equilibrium
quantities in country 1 do not vary throughout the whole region, because in the situation
described the integration parameters T and U inuence the situation in this country
neither on the goods nor on the capital market.
We next describe equilibria which involve manufacturing in both countries and capital
ows between the countries.
20
Two cases have to be distinguished: The case where
both sectors, manufacturing and agriculture, are active in both countries, and the case
where only manufacturing is active in one country and agriculture and manufacturing
are active in the other one. Again we will take country 1 to be the more industrialised
country. The existence of equilibria of these types depends on the values of certain
parameters. To have capital ows from 2 to 1, the interest rates have to be related by
r
1
= r
2
U .
Let us rst look at the case where country 1 is specialised in manufacturing and country
2 has agriculture and manufacturing.
21
We solve for this equilibrium by using the
following indirect approach. Regarding the case under investigation, we know that w
1
either has to equal 1 or has to be larger than one. Thus, we set w
1
= w with w  1. Using
(22), we get 
2
=
(1  )
1 
(1+ w)  w. For 0  
2
 1 w  w
max
=
(1  )
(1 ) (1  )
has
to hold. On the other hand for w
max
 1, we have to impose  
1 
2(1  )
which is the
20
At the end of this section we will also look at equilibria that have an uneven allocation of manu-
facturing but no capital ows.
21
So this is the specialised case for a large manufacturing sector. If  
1 
2(1  )
, this kind of
equilibrium is possible for all values of T and U , not only for a bounded set like the one described by
equation (26).
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Figure 1: The feasible region of T and U allowing for a small specialised equilibrium is
bounded by the two solid lines. Parameter values:  = 0:25,  = 0:35,  = 0:5,  = 5.
The parabolic dotted lines are two integration paths, i.e. paths of T and U converging
to (1; 1). The convex curve is given by T = U
2
  2U + 2, the concave curve is given by
T = 0:3U
1
2
+ 1.
already familiar restriction for a suciently large manufacturing sector. Use r
i
~
K
i
= w
i

i
to get
~
K
2
=
U
2
w+U
2
. From r
1
= r
2
U we know that
~
K
2
has to be smaller than
1
2
or
equal to
1
2
. This implies that U  U
max
( w) =
w(1 )
(1  )(1+ w)  w(1 )
. For U
max
( w)  1
the condition w 
(1  )
2(1 ) (1  )
has to be imposed. Combining all the formulas
used above, we have equilibria with only manufacturing in 1 and with agriculture and
manufacturing in 2 for  
1 
2(1  )
, w
1
2 [1;
(1  )
(1 ) (1  )
] and U 2 [1; U
max
(w
1
)].
Straightforward substitution then yields
~
K
1
=
w
1
w
1
+U
2
, r
1
= w
1
+U
2
and r
2
=
w+U
2
U
.
The price indices in the two countries can be found by solving the price index equations
which can be transformed to
P
1 
1
= r
 
2
(U
 
w
1
1 (1  )
P
 
1
+ 
2
P
 
2
T
 ( 1)
) (27)
P
1 
2
= r
 
2
(U
 
w
1
1 (1  )
P
 
1
T
 ( 1)
+ 
2
P
 
2
) (28)
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using n
i
p
i
= w
i

i
and (11).
There is a continuum of equilibria given the parameter values. We have parameterised
this equilibrium set by choosing w
1
. This is equivalent to a specic allocation of the
revenue of the manufacturing sector to workers and capital owners because r
1
is also
depending on w
1
. Therefore the continuum of equilibria arises from dierent possibilities
of distributing the manufacturing revenue.
22
Now equilibria in which both sectors are active in both countries and which involve
capital ows between the countries can be found by performing similar manipulations.
Here 
1
is set to an undetermined


1
. The results are in brief:
(1  )
1 
<


1
 1
23
and
U  U
max
(


1
) =


1
(1 )
2(1  ) 


1
(1 )
. We also get r
1
=


1
+U
2
and
~
K
1
=


1


1
+U
2
. The
price indices can now be found by solving
P
1 
1
= r
 
2
(U
 


1
P
 
1
+ 
2
P
 
2
T
 ( 1)
) (29)
P
1 
2
= r
 
2
(U
 


1
P
 
1
T
 ( 1)
+ 
2
P
 
2
) (30)
for P
1
and P
2
.
It nally remains to characterise equilibria without capital ows but an uneven allo-
cation of manufacturing to the two countries. First we note that there are no capital
ows for r
1
=U < r
2
< r
1
U . We can therefore write r
2
= r
1
S for S 2 (
1
U
; U). This
implies 
1
=
2(1  )
(1 )(1+S)
and 
2
=
2(1  )S
(1 )(1+S)
.
24
Also 0 < 
i
 1 has to hold which is
guaranteed by
2(1  )
1 
 1 < S <
1 
2(1  ) (1 )
25
, i.e. we have bounds on the value
of S that support equilibria of this type. The other variables are found by inserting 
i
and r
i
in the corresponding equations, the price indices are now found by solving
P
1 
1
= 2
 
(
1 
1
P
 
1
+ 
1 
2
P
 
2
T
 ( 1)
) (31)
P
1 
2
= 2
 
(
1 
1
P
 
1
T
 ( 1)
+ 
1 
2
P
 
2
) (32)
In all the above cases the modied price index equations can be dierentiated with
respect to P
1
, P
2
, T and U in order to get the comparative statics of the price indices
(and therefore real income) with respect to all the parameters evaluated at these equilib-
ria.
26
Comparative statics for all the other variables is straightforward since analytical
expressions are available for them.
22
Technically the non-uniqueness of equilibrium stems from non{(strict){convexities like linear tech-
nology in agriculture, the demand of capitalists and xed costs in manufacturing. As we have seen
before, the linear specication of the capitalists leads to a capital supply function that is indeterminate
for equal net interest rates between the two countries.
23
We assume again  >
1 
2(1  )
. For  
1 
2(1  )
the same reasoning applies with
(1  )
1 
<

1

2(1  )
1 
. This type of equilibrium is of course possible for manufacturing sectors of any size.
24
For country 1 being the country with the higher interest rate, we have to restrict S to be in (
1
U
; 1).
25
As usual we assume  >
1 
2(1  )
. The values of S that are feasible are S 2 (
1
U
; U)\ (
2(1  )
1 
 
1;
1 
2(1  ) (1 )
). The case  <
1 
2(1  )
can be handled in a completely similar way.
26
Because the price indices are found numerically one has to insert the numerical values of P
i
and
the analytically given values of the other variables into two- dimensional systems of linear equations.
See Appendix B.
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4 Market Integration
In this section we report the consequences of economic integration on the two countries
by drawing on the results from Section 3.
We assume that the capitalists do have the power to choose the equilibrium that max-
imises the return on investment, i.e. there are no legal or institutional restrictions on
the actions of the capitalists.
27
Another interpretation is that this equlibrium selection
is the result of a bargaining process where all the bargaining power is in the hands
of the capitalists.
28
>From the preferences of the capitalists, it follows that only the
imperfections on the capital market, given by U , exert inuence on their choices. The
paths have a structure as described in the following table where we see the dependence
of the chosen equilibrium on U .
Table 1: The capitalists' income maximising equilibria during economic integration.
In this table the term specialised means that the country has devoted all labour to
manufacturing.
29
Equilibrium type Wage in 1 U
1 specialised, 2 both sectors

w
min
(U) U  U

=
1 
2(1  ) (1 )
Both sectors in 1 and 2 1 U

=
1 
3(1 ) 4(1  )
 U  U

1 specialised, 2 only agri. w
max
U  U

It is interesting to note that for U  U

, the optimal (nominal) wage level set by the
capitalists is the maximum possible wage which leads to the limiting case 
2
(w
1
) = 0 in
this situation.
30
So all the capital owned by capitalists resident in country 2 is invested
in country 1. This means that for U  U

, the interest rate that can be generated
by concentrating all the manufacturing is large enough to make foreign investment
protable. The high wages are accompanied by high prices which are the basis for gen-
erating higher interest rates than in a situation where manufacturing would be allocated
to both countries.
This set-up implies that according to the investment decisions taken by capital owners
who decide about industrial agglomerations workers are directly inuenced by integra-
tion on the goods markets and indirectly by integration on the capital market. In the
27
One could e.g. think of unions that may inuence wage negotiations or the like.
28
See the discussion after Figure 3 for what is happening when bargaining power is attached to both
groups.
29
w
min
(U) =
U(1  )
(1+U)(1 ) U(1  )
. The above table assumes  
2(1 )
3(1  )
, for  larger than this
value country 1 will be specialised throughout the whole sequence of integration, and country 2 will
have both sectors for U 
1 
(1 ) (1  )
and only agriculture for U smaller than this value.
30
In this section the sequence of equilibria is computed along the concave path shown in Figure 1.
Of course any path (T; U)! (1; 1) serves the same purpose, but this one is already drawn in Figure 1.
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following graphs we will show and discuss the qualitative results of integration on the
equilibrium sequence.
31
In Figure 2 we see the development of the capitalists' income
in the two countries. During the process of integration the income of the capitalists
of the less industrialised country approaches the income of the capitalists of country
1 which is constant for small U .
32
Clearly, as soon as all the capital is invested in
country 1, the capitalists resident in this country have no additional gains from further
integration on the capital market. This is the reason for a perfect catch-up on the side
of the capitalists. Concerning the fraction of labour employed in the two countries in
Figure 2: The capitalists' income C
i
during the process of integration. The solid line
represents C
1
, the horizontal dashed line is the constant income of capitalists in the
symmetric equilibrium and the upper dashed line is C
1
+C
2
. The parameter values are
 = 0:11,  = 0:25,  = 0:75 and  = 5.
manufacturing, we see in Figure 3 that up to a certain point of economic integration
the less developed country is experiencing a rise in the manufacturing sector.
It may be an important note that an equilibrium sequence in which the objective were
not the maximisation of C, but the maximisation of a weighted average of C and !
33
,
would not only lead to higher real income of workers in both countries, it would also
31
For maximising the worldwide income of capitalists, the qualitative behaviour is structurally anal-
ogous.
GAUSS and Mathematica programmes for all the computations performed in this paper are available
from the author upon request.
32
The income is constant for U 
1 
(1 ) (1  )
, the situation described in the third line of Table 1.
33
As the result of a bargaining process
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avoid the complete de-industrialisation of one country. This is again a consequence of
the fact that the continuum of equilibria arises precisely because of a continuum of pos-
sibilities regarding the distribution of manufacturing revenue to workers or capitalists.
Figure 3: Shares 
i
devoted to manufacturing during the process of integration. The
solid line represents 
1
. Parameter values as in Fig. 2.
It may be interesting to note why it is possible that country 1 is also specialised in
manufacturing for large values of U , but without cross border capital ows. This is
possible because the agricultural goods that are demanded in country 1 can be pur-
chased without trade costs on the worldwide agricultural market.
We next turn to the real income of workers in the two countries. Here we have a more
complicated picture than for the capitalists' income. The workers of the poorer country
rst experience a phase of catching-up. At the point of de-industrialisation of their
country they are facing a large decline in real income. After that their income is rising
again but is never getting equal to the income of the workers in the industrialized
country. We also see that the gain in real income of the workers in country 1 is smaller
than the loss that occurs in country 2. That gain in real income is solely caused by the
decline in transportation costs.
The predictions of the model can therefore be summarised as follows. There is an initial
phase of catch-up of the less industrialised country. This is a situation in which there
is trade between the specialised country and the country that has both sectors active.
At this stage of integration there is only trade in goods, manufactures and agriculture,
but no trade in production factors, i.e. there are no capital ows. During that phase we
observe rising income of the capitalists and rising real wages in country 2. In country
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Figure 4: The workers' real income !
i
during the process of integration. The solid line
represents !
1
and the upper dashed line is !
1
+ !
2
. Parameter values as in Fig. 2.
1 the real wages are also increasing due to lowered transportation costs but the capi-
talists' income is steadily decreasing there.
After that stage the next phase of integration is characterised by the fact that in both
countries both sectors are active. Here we see a declining labour share in manufacturing
in country 1 and an increasing share in country 2. With regard to this phase of integra-
tion, many observers are worried about an export of manufacturing jobs to developing
countries. The pattern of income changes is as in stage 1.
Then, at a certain point of integration, when the restrictions to capital mobility are
declining below a critical value, it is becoming protable to locate all the manufacturing
in one country. This is the point in the process of economic integration when not only
trade in goods but also in production factors is observed. When that happens and all
the capital is invested in country 1, the workers of country 2 experience a substantial
decrease in real income while those in country 1 face a rise in real income. This de-
velopment occurs because transportation costs only have to be paid for consumption
purposes in country 2. This is also the reason why real wages do not change in country
1 from that point onwards.
The same holds true for the capitalists in country 1. Further integration on the capital
markets only favours the capitalists resident in country 2 because they experience an
equalisation of gross and net interest rates when the restrictions to capital mobility are
vanishing.
The above description shows that in our model the picture presented by Krugman
and Venables (1995) is modied in several important respects: The rst dierence to
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be noted is that the starting point is no longer a symmetric situation but a situa-
tion where one country is specialised in manufacturing and the other country has some
manufacturing, too. This is probably a more realistic starting point to discuss economic
integration. After that one observes a smooth reallocation of manufacturing to the less
industrialised country that undergoes a period of catch-up. Only in the nal stage that
leads to perfect integration in the end is manufacturing completely concentrated in one
country.
The other important dierence is that in our model integration only equalises the in-
come of capital owners. The income of the workers in the dierent countries is not
equalised but the concentration of manufacturing widens the income gap between the
workers in the two countries.
This means that integration does favour the owners of the more mobile factor, i.e. cap-
ital, compared to the owners of the immobile factor labour. The workers in country 1
gain from integration because they happen to live in the right country. Once again, in
contrast to Krugman and Venables (1995) not everybody gains from economic integra-
tion.
5 Final Remarks
Adding another group of agents to the Krugman and Venables model delivers a much
more diversied picture than the starting point model. Our crude introduction of agent
heterogeneity indicates that the eects of economic integration on income distribution
deserve attention.
34
In the context of the present model, it may be worth looking at social welfare max-
imising sequences of equilibria, in which of course, the choice of an appropriate social
welfare function is an essential question. Another possibility would be to introduce ex-
plicitly some sort of bargaining to explain the distribution of national income.
Although the model is intended to be concerned with long-run developments, it is still
restrictive since the static character of the model makes it impossible to include capi-
tal accumulation dynamics, which are of course important in the long run and would
provide a link to growth theory.
Some of the suggestions for further research mentioned at the end of Krugman and
Venables (1995) are still relevant.
35
The main points are: More geography and some
empirical work to confront the model with. Empirical work could be based on the work
of Hummels and Levinsohn (1995).
Nevertheless, despite all these problems, we think it is useful to construct a simple
model which makes global analysis possible analytically, and which gives rise to rela-
tively complex patterns during the integration of the world economy.
34
It is a well-known fact in economics that at the aggregate level steps towards free trade usually
increase welfare but some groups may end worse o.
35
Maybe not the suggestion to include capital mobility.
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A The perfectly asymmetric case
In this appendix we derive the equilibrium quantities for the perfectly asymmetric case.
For this case we know 
1
= 1; 
2
= 0 and w
2
= 1. For labour income we know Y
1
= w
1
and Y
2
= 1. Next use (22) to obtain w
1
=
(1  )
(1 )(1  )+
. For this to be greater
than one or equal to one  
1 
2(1  )
has to hold.
36
Insert the known quantities in
the expenditure equations (13) to get E
1
= 
(1  )+
(1 )(1  )+
and E
2
= . >From the
price index equation (15) we obtain P
1
= w
1
. This implies !
1
= w
1 
1
, !
2
= w
 
1
T
 
,
C
1
=

(1 )(1  )+
and C
2
= C
1
=U . Again by inserting in the wage-interest equation
for country 2 at the described point we can decide when it is an equilibrium. The
wage-interest equation can now be transformed to
r

2
= r
(1 )
1
[f(1      ) + gT
1 
+ f(1  )(1     ) + gT
 1
]T
 
(33)
This yields
U
 
> r
(1  )
1
[f(1     ) + gT
1 
+ f(1  )(1     ) + gT
 1
]T
 
(34)
with r
1
= w
1
as the curve describing the feasible region of T and U that allow for
perfectly asymmetric specialisation given the other parameters.
B Some Comparative Statics
In this appendix we summarize the results of comparative statics in tables. The variables
that are investigated are Y
i
, E
i
, 
i
, r
i
, w
i
, C
i
, P
i
and !
i
, the parameters with respect
to which dierentiation is carried out are , , , , T and U . The following tables
have to be read as follows, the rows correspond to the variables that are written in
the rst entry and the columns correspond to the parameters with respect to which
dierentiation is taking place. Rows that would contain only 0s have been omitted, e.g.
the row for Y in Table 2.
With two assumptions, or restrictions on the parameters, one arrives at relatively clear
results for the required derivatives. The two restrictions that have to be made are
1 (1  ) < 0
37
and 1  > 0. They have been imposed in the derivation of all the
results of the comparative statics analysis.
36
For  =
1 
2(1  )
we have w
1
= 1.
37
Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1998) have an analogous restriction and call it the No Black Hole
condition.
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Table 2: Comparative Statics for the symmetric equilibrium
    T U
E 0 > 0 > 0 0 0 0
 < 0 < 0 > 0 0 0 0
r < 0 < 0 > 0 0 0 0
C > 0 > 0 > 0 0 0 0
P > 0 > 0
()
?
()
? > 0 0
! > 0 > 0
()
< 0 ? < 0 0
()
in Table 2 means that the sign of
@P
@
and
@!
@
is only determined for T
1 
< 2

  1.
Because of  < 1 and  > 1 this inequality is fullled for T larger than T
()
with
T
()
= T
()
(; ; ) and T
()
> 1.
()
shall indicate that
@!
@
has a sign that can only be directly determined when T
1 

2


 1
 1 holds. This inequality is true for T < T
()
where T
()
= T
()
(; ; ; ).
T
()
is only larger than 1 when  >
1
2
.
For xed ;  and  T
()
> T
()
holds, so at most one of the two described cases,
()
or
()
, can hold.
Table 3: Comparative Statics for the small  specialised equilibrium
    T U
E
1
0 > 0 > 0 0 0 0
E
2
0 0 > 0 0 0 0

1
< 0 < 0 > 0 0 0 0
r
1
< 0 < 0 > 0 0 0 0
C
1
> 0 > 0 > 0 0 0 0
C
2
> 0 > 0 > 0 0 0 < 0
P
1
< 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 0 0
P
2
< 0 > 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 0
!
1
> 0 < 0 ? > 0 0 0
!
2
> 0 < 0 ? > 0 < 0 0
For completeness' sake we also report the results for the perfectly asymmetric case.
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Table 4: Comparative Statics for the perfectly asymmetric equilibrium
    T U
Y
1
< 0 < 0 > 0 0 0 0
E
1
< 0 > 0 > 0 0 0 0
E
2
0 0 > 0 0 0 0
r
1
< 0 < 0 > 0 0 0 0
w
1
< 0 < 0 > 0 0 0 0
C
1
> 0 > 0 > 0 0 0 0
C
2
> 0 > 0 > 0 0 0 < 0
P
1
< 0 < 0 > 0 0 0 0
P
2
< 0 < 0 > 0 0 > 0 0
!
1
< 0 < 0 ?
()
0 0 0
!
2
> 0 > 0 < 0 0 < 0 0
()
: For w
1
 exp

(1 )(1 )
((1 ) (1  ))

@!
1
@
is positive.
We now present the (analytical part of the) comparative statics for the price indices for
the equilibria having manufacturing in both countries. We will exemplify the analysis
for the case where there is only manufacturing in country 1 and both sectors are active
in country 2.
38
We restrict the analysis to dierentiating with respect to 3 parameters
or variables, T , U and w
1
, which is in fact a parameter for the present case as well.
39
If x stands for one of the parameters, then the solution for
@P
i
@x
can be found by solving
A
 
@P
1
@x
@P
2
@x
!
=
 
b
x
1
b
x
2
!
A is given by
0
@
(1  )P
 
1
+ U
 
w
1 (1  )
1
P
 (1+)
1

2
P
 (1+
2
T
 ( 1)
U
 
r
 
2
w
1 (1  )
1
P
 (1+)
1
T
 ( 1)
(1  )P
 
2
+ r
 
2

2
P
 (1+)
2
1
A
and the b
x
are given by
b
T
=
 
(1  )
2
P
 
2
T
 
(1  )U
 
w
1 (1  )
P
 
1
T
 
!
b
U
= r
 1 
2
U
2
w
 
RHS
27
RHS
28
!
+
+r
 
2
U
 1 
w
1 (1  )
P
 
1
 
1
T
 ( 1)
!
38
This is the case where the price indices are found by solving equations (27) and (28).
39
For the two other cases we would have to dierentiate w.r.t. T , U and


1
or S.
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b
w
=  r
 1 
2
@r
2
@ w
 
RHS
27
RHS
28
!
+
+(1  (1      ))r
 
2
U
 
w
 (1  )
P
 
1
 
1
T
 ( 1)
!
+
+r
 
2
P
 
2
@
2
@ w
 
T
 ( 1)
1
!
where RHS
27
and RHS
28
are the expressions on the right hand side of equations (27)
and (28).
@
2
@ w
=
(1  )
1 
 1 < 0 and
@r
2
@ w
=
1
U
+
@
2
@ w
.
@r
2
@ w
is 0 for U =
1 
(1 ) (1  )
, is
larger than 0 for U smaller than this value and smaller than 0 for larger U . Numerical
experiments for this case yield denite results:
@P
i
@T
> 0,
@P
i
@U
< 0 and
@P
i
@ w
> 0.
Doing completely similar manipulations, one can derive the required partial derivatives
for the other parameters and the other cases.
40
40
For a given case for all the parameters x the matrix A is xed, only the vectors b
x
change.
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